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and crises management policies∗
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to identify which factors explain why some countries are more
prone to enjoy long durations of stability, while others experience crises in shorter intervals.
To this end, we analyze the duration of stability periods between currency, debt, and
banking crises from 1980 to 2008. We find that durations of tranquility between currency and
debt crises are bimodally distributed, making conventional econometric models unsuitable.
Therefore, we introduce an innovative econometric strategy, the Finite Mixture Model.
Real and financial variables are found to have high predictive power for the spell of sta-
bility between currency crises, while for debt crises, the real interest rate is observed to be
the best predictor. The time between the occurrence of systemic financial crises is prolonged
through large-scale government interventions and IMF aid programs, while recapitalization
turns out to have a negative impact.
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1 Introduction
Recent public and academic debates have predominantly revolved around the onset and direct re-
covery from financial crises episodes. Some scholars, such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2010/09)have
however turned their attention to the recurrence of banking crises. They show that these peren-
nial events have occurred at a relatively stable frequency in both emerging and established market
nations. An even smaller share of the literature has been devoted to the fact that some countries
have faced more crises than others. To the best of our knowledge, none of the studies carried out
so far has examined the determinants of the length of stability periods between financial crises.
The frequency of financial crises has, amongst others, been analyzed by Jorda`, Schularick and
Taylor (2010) who investigate empirically if crises can be predicted by macroeconomic fundamen-
tals or whether they are randomly distributed events. The authors conclude that most financial
crises occur randomly. Regarding the behavior of macroeconomic variables during pre- and post-
crises periods, they find that such events are preceded by low natural interest rates and rising
credit, while a large share of financial crises episodes are followed by recessions. Distinguishing
between “normal” recessions during the business cycle and recessions accompanied by financial
crises, they discover that the latter ones are one third more costly in terms of output losses.
Tudela (2004) adopts a duration model approach to analyze the determinants of currency
crises. One of the main objectives of the study is to test for time dependence, that is, the
length of the time already spent in a tranquil period as a determinant of the probability of exit
into a crisis state. A justification for the use of this framework is that duration models allow
to account for duration dependence amongst the determinants of the likelihood of speculative
attacks, without neglecting the use of time-varying explanatory variables. The results exhibit the
existence of a highly significant negative duration dependence. The highest probability to exit
into a currency crises state is therefore observed during the initial phase of the tranquil period.
While the duration between crises is directly linked to the frequency of crises, distinct con-
clusions can be drawn from the analysis of either one. Dissimilar economic fundamentals could
be at play in a country experiencing a certain number of crises clustered over a short period
of time, and another country experiencing the same number of crises spread out over a larger
period of time. By examining entire periods of stability we can take into account and disentangle
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factor development during the period of recovery and consider the immediate time span before
financial turmoil occurs.
This study therefore estimates various models analyzing the duration between different types
of financial crises in order to identify whether some variables explain why some countries are more
prone to enjoy long durations of stability, while others experience crises in shorter intervals.
In order to do so, we analyze the duration of stability periods between currency, debt, and
banking crises from 1980 to 2008. The distribution of this variable appears to be bimodal
regarding currency and debt crisis. Two groups of observations emerge: one depicting average
stability periods of around 5 years and a second group experiencing crises roughly each 15 years.
The distribution of the duration between banking crises is unimodal with a peak at 11 years.
From a methodological point of view, the existence of bimodal distributions of durations
between currency and debt crises makes traditional econometric methods non-valid. One of the
main contributions of this paper is that it uses an innovative approach which is robust to the
problems of asymmetric, skewed, or multimodal distributions, namely the Finite Mixture Model
(FMM).
The FMM is estimated separately for currency and debt crises including 3 groups of con-
comitant variables: real variables (Investment, GDP per capita, real interest rate), financial and
monetary variables (M2 / reserves, Credit / GDP, Net Foreign asset / GDP), as well as equi-
librium or external sector variables (Current Account / GDP, the real exchange rate, and terms
of trade). For each variable, we distinguish between the long term (recovery) and immediate
pre-crisis impact. The model permits differentiation between the effects of an explanatory vari-
able on the probability of belonging to either group of observations and on the variability within
both groups. Finally, we focus on systemic financial crises analyzing the impact of different
macroeconomic and regulatory policies on the stability periods after those episodes.
Some of the main findings regarding stability periods between currency crises are that high
GDP growth in the three years prior to a currency crises tends to postpone potential crises
conditional on the observation belonging to the group of relatively short stability periods of five
years. An increase in the real interest rate during the three years prior to a crisis decreases the
duration of stability periods. An accumulation of net foreign assets does prove to be an effective
mean to prolong stability periods. Regarding the real exchange rate, we capture an effect in line
3
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with the second generation of self fulfilling crises models.
We find that our results are consistent with the debt sustainability literature and that the
main country characteristics usually considered by rating agencies in order to classify sovereign
default risk are statistically significant in explaining the length of stability periods between debt
crises.
The FMM model is found to predict durations between financial crises fairly well. Clear
differences between the predictive power of the different groups of variables exist.
An expansionary fiscal policy during the first three years after a systemic banking crisis has
no effect on the duration of the length of the stability period.
The duration of stability periods after systemic crises decreases with the level of the maximum
of liquidity support in percentage of deposit that monetary authorities accorded to banks. It
is however not influenced by the reduction of reserve requirements in the three years following
a crisis. We conclude that only large-scale government interventions in banks have a reducing
effect on the length of stability periods after a systemic banking crisis.
Large-scale government interventions may help to restore the confidence in banks and to
sustain accelerated recovery of the economy. In addition, an adoption of IMF programs during
and/or after a systemic banking crisis may help to stabilize the economy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data used
and preliminary statistics on the occurrence of financial crises and the duration between them.
Section 3 presents the methodology, introducing the Finite Mixture Model and explains the
choice and computation of the concomitant variables. Section 4 offers bootstrap estimations as
a solution to the small sample issue and estimation results concerning stability periods between
currency and debt crises. The predictive quality of each group of variables is assessed. Section
5 provides policy recommendations after systemic financial crises. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Data
This study uses annual data from 1960 through 2008 for 176 developing and developed countries.
Sources for macroeconomic indicators are shown in the appendix, Table 13.
• Financial Crises Indicators
Financial crises indicators are taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008). Currency, banking,
and debt crises are identified over the period from 1970 to 2008.
The existence of a banking crisis is evaluated on the basis of a number of quantitative and
subjective criteria, such as a large number of defaults and a high quantity of non-performing
loans. This can be caused by factors such as depressed asset prices, sharp increases in the real
interest rate, capital flow reversals, or depositor runs on banks.
The starting year of a currency crisis is identified building on an approach developed in
Frankel and Rose (1996). A currency crisis is thus defined as a nominal depreciation of the
respective currency of at least 30 percent, which is also at least a 10 percent increase in the
rate of depreciation compared to the year before. Their list also comprises large devaluations by
countries under fixed exchange rate regimes.
Sovereign debt crises are reported in the case of sovereign defaults to private lending and in
a year of debt rescheduling.
We identify the starting year of a systemic crisis (twin or triple crisis) as the occurrence of a
banking or currency crisis in year t, combined with at least one other type of crisis during the
period [t-1, t+2].
As can be seen in Figure 1, the number of currency crises peaked during the early eighties and
again during the early nineties with the occurrence of around 30 currency crises per year. After
the Asian financial turmoil during the late nineties, currency crises have become less frequent.
Banking crises have in general been less frequent than currency crises and peaked during
the early nineties (as amongst others, several Latin American countries experienced difficulties
defending their exchange rates, resulting in large problems in their banking sectors). The number
of banking crises per year increased during the late eighties up to its high in 1994 with 18 crises
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per year and from then on decreased to a low of two banking crises in the year 2003. Debt
crises occurred mainly during the early eighties and stayed at a low level until the year 2002,
when Urugay, Dominica, Gabon, and Moldova struggled to repay their debt. Debt crises nearly
ceased to exist until recently, as only the Dominican Republic in 2003 and Grenada in 2004 had
to reschedule their debt. Recently, several European countries are experiencing difficulties in
repaying their debt. Debt crises should therefore not be dismissed as a past phenomena but
could well be a recurrent phenomenon in the close future.
Relatively few financial crises have occurred during the late 1970s after the fall of the Bretton
Woods system in 1971-1973. A period of high stability was observed until early 1980. The
financial crises that followed after 1980 started becoming a more frequently observed phenomena
subsequently. These crises are believed to follow different underlying causes than the crises in
early 1970, as countries after the fall of the Bretton Woods system largely conducted their own
monetary policy and shifted towards more or less flexible exchange rate policies. Capital flow
liberalization was taken onto the political agenda after 1973, changing fundamentals for financial
crises episodes. Due to these reasons and a significant increase in data availability, the starting
point for our analysis is set at 1980, leaving a period of 29 years from 1980 until 2008 covering
163 currency crises, 111 banking crises, and 52 debt crises.
• Duration of stability between financial crises
We consider a duration of stability between financial crises to be specific for each currency-,
debt-, and banking crises in each country. A duration of tranquility starts the year after the
onset of a financial crisis observed in the respective country, and continues until observance of the
same type of crisis, independent of eventual onsets of one of the other two types of crises. The
data is left censored as 1980 is defined as the onset of a period of stability for all countries. Since
a period of stability necessarily has to be ended by another crisis of the same type as marks the
onset, a duration is not registered as such if no crisis has occurred after the last crisis until 2008.
The resulting number of stability periods is consequently the same as the number of financial
crises episodes.
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Figure 1: Distribution of financial crises
1Source: Authors’ calculations
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 Kernel density of duration
The histograms and kernel density functions of stability periods for all three types of crises are
displayed in Figure 2. Periods of stability between currency crises last on average nine years,
with the minimum duration of stability being two years and the maximum being 23 years. The
longest periods of stability between currency crises have been enjoyed by Libya and Guinea,
which experienced their first currency crises in 2002 and 2005 respectively. 53 stability periods
of less or equal to five years can be observed. A large share of these short stability periods are
experienced by Latin American countries.
The average length of stability periods between debt crises is 8.6 years, with the shortest
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period lasting for two years and the longest lasting 29 years, while the average duration of
stability between banking crises is longer (11.5 years) than the duration between currency or
debt crises. The higher average is however driven by a group of high income countries which
have never experienced a banking crisis.
In order to treat our data statistically and to identify driving factors of different durations
of stability periods within each group of crises, we first take a closer look at each distribution of
length of periods between crises.
Figure 2: Histogram and Kernel density of durations
2Source: Authors’ calculations
Examination of the kernel densities depicted in Figure 2 suggests that stability periods be-
tween currency and debt crises are not normally distributed. The density functions of durations
between currency and debt crises suggest bimodal distributions, while periods of stability be-
tween banking crises are “unimodally distributed” . Two groups of durations between currency
crises exist. In the first group, currency crises take place on average every 5 years, while the av-
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erage duration of stability in group two is roughly 15 years. Durations of stability between debt
crises portray a bimodal distribution around 4 and 20 years, even though bimodality of stability
duration is less pronounced than for currency crises. Periods between banking crises seem to be
unimodally distributed. The picture changes once durations are decomposed for different income
groups.
Figure 3: Kernel density of durations: World Bank income groups
3Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 3. shows the underlying distributions for each kernel density function per income
group as defined by the World Bank. Stability periods between currency crises are bimodally
distributed for every income group. Low income countries on average experience shorter dura-
tions of stability, while their bimodality is most pronounced. Middle income countries seem to
be the most homogenous group in terms of durations of stability periods, experiencing longer
periods of stability in both clusters of durations. High income countries experienced a higher
share of stability periods of longer than 18 years then the remaining two income groups. Their
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distribution of stability durations is nearly unimodal and skewed with a tail to the right.
Stability periods for debt crises can only be depicted for low and middle income countries
as there are not enough debt crises episodes for high income countries in the sample in order to
calculate the kernel density function. Both distributions are bimodally distributed. Middle in-
come countries do not in general experience longer periods between debt crises but do experience
fewer debt crises in general.
The distribution of durations for banking crises is most heterogeneous between income groups.
While the distributions for high and low income countries are unimodal, middle income countries
are split in two groups with a peak corresponding to a very short duration of stability periods.
This seems consistent with Gaytan and Ranciere (2006) who show that for middle income coun-
tries financial development has a positive long term effect on growth but makes countries more
prone to banking crisis. Tornell and Westermann (2002, 2003) observe that after liberalization
of financial markets, macro variables of middle income countries followed a marked boom and
bust pattern due to credit market imperfections. The authors explain that these economies are
characterized by a prominent non-tradable sector. This sector is more banking dependent and
depicts a significant degree of maturity mismatch. A real depreciation in the non-tradable sector
has balance sheet effects which amplify the initial negative shock. In addition, the credit channel
is more important for countries with less access to foreign capital markets.
Due to the bimodality of stability periods as such and their heterogenous underlying distribu-
tions, a method is proposed which employs the statistical properties of bimodal distributions and
clustering of observations over time. As asymmetric bimodal densities are observed for currency
crises and debt crises, normal mixture densities are chosen to model the distribution of data as
proposed by Pearson (1894).
2.2.2 Quantile-Quantile (QQ) Plot : Test for randomness of crises occurrence
In order to report robust results, it is inevitable to confirm if and how it is valid to pool obser-
vations across countries and time into a single sample. If one assumes that the arrival of crises
is independent across countries, then it is possible to pool the duration between financial crises
in a single sample without experiencing any econometric issues. Otherwise, a manifestation of
clustering over time in data would result in an empirical distribution of the data being over-
10
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dispersed. In this case, a specific estimation strategy consistent with over-dispersed distribution
is needed.
To do so, we follow a strategy employed byJorda`, Taylor and al.(2010), adopting the Q-Q plot
non parametric test for diagnosing random occurrence of financial crises (i.e temporal clustering
of crises events ). In this test, financial crises are evaluated by Bernoulli trials with probability
p: Under the null hypothesis, durations between crises events are distributed as a geometric
random variable. Under the alternative, crises appear in clusters, meaning that we are likely to
observe a high proportion of small durations relative to the theoretical quintals implied by the
geometric distribution, thus generating over- dispersion.
The main idea of this test is to evaluate, given a random sample of univariate data points,
whether this sample comes from a specified distribution F. Rather than considering individual
quantiles, the QQ plot considers the sample as a whole and draws the sample quantiles against
the theoretical quantiles of the specified target distribution F. As a theoretical distribution, we
use a geometric distribution which evaluates the probability of being in state k in t, given the
fact that we are in state m during the last (t-1) periods.
Concretely, this theoretical distribution can be formulated as follows. Let dk be the duration
between two financial crises which occurred at t and t+ dk respectively, and q the probability
that a given country experiences a crisis at t. The probability that this country falls and remains
into a period of stability until t+ dk, given the fact that it has experienced a financial crisis at
t, is equal to:
P = Prob (D = dk) = q (1− q)dk−1 (1)
Where q =
∑
k Ik
N
is the maximum likelihood estimator of financial crisis occurrence probability;
with Ik representing an indicative variable which is equal to 1 at the date of financial crisis and
0 otherwise. N is the number of observations in the sample.
The empirical density of our data is estimated using an epanechnikov kernel density:
fˆn =
1
n
n∑
i
Kn (d− di) = 1
nh
n∑
i
Kn
(
d− di
h
)
(2)
where K is the kernel; a symmetric but not necessarily positive function that integrates to
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one. Let Fn(d) =
1
n
∑n
1 I (di ≤ d) represent the cumulative distribution function of duration,
then the QQ plot statistic is given by the random closed set such as:
Sn = {inf{d : F (d) ≥ i
n+ 1
}, Di:n, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} (3)
The QQ plot test consequently compares the theoretical quantiles to the empirical quantiles
of the distribution. If the data are well represented by the Bernoulli/Geometric assumption, a
plot of the theoretical quantiles against the empirical quantiles will result in a graph which traces
the 45 degree line. However, if there is any sort of clustering across time, especially in the lower
quantiles,this will be identified through differences between distributions.
Figure 4: QQ plot test for randomness of crises occurence
4Source: Authors’ calculations
As can be seen in the Figure 4 for currency, debt and banking crises, the empirical distribution
deviates from the 45 degree line. We can consequently conclude that the occurrence of currency
and debt crises cannot be represented as a “fully” random process. In addition, according to the
kernel density of banking crises, we think that the deviation from the benchmark line is probably
12
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due to the presence of outliers in the distribution (or an over-dispersion in the distribution).
These results provide us with a justification for using a model which uses a pooled sample of
durations for each crisis rather than a model which distinguishes the cross section dimension of
our data.
As has been shown above, both tests, the QQ-Plot as well as a visual inspection of the kernel
density functions, lead us to the conclusion that the data should be represented by a multi-modal
distribution.
The objective of the next section is to show that the model chosen is coherent with the
objective to be attained and the data used therefore.
3 Methodology
3.1 The Finite Mixture Model
The extent and the potential for applications of finite mixture models (FMM) have widened con-
siderably during the past decade. Initially, FMM models have been used in medical studies with
different subgroups of patients. Because of their flexibility, mixture models are being increasingly
exploited as a convenient, semi-parametric way in which to model unknown distributional shapes.
Finite mixture models provide great flexibility in fitting models with many modes, skewness and
non-standard distributional characteristics. Other recent developments covered include the use
of mixture models for handling over dispersion in generalized linear models and are proposed
for dealing with mixed continuous and categorical variables. In some instances, components are
introduced into the mixture model to allow for greater flexibility in modeling a heterogeneous
population which can not be modeled by a single component distribution.
In comparison with techniques relying on visual identification, one of the advantages of finite
mixture models is that this framework permits to avoid spurious identification of clusters in
data. Indeed, bimodality in a given histogram of featured data is suggestive of the possibility
that the data have been drawn from a mixture distribution. However, bimodality (or a linear
combinations of the data if multivariate) does not always imply that the data have been sampled
from a mixture distribution5. This problem can be avoided by applying FMM models.
5This point was illustrated in the seminal paper of Day (1969) on normal mixture models
13
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The main limit of Finite Mixture Models is related to the difficulty to distinguish between
inherently skewed distributions and mixtures6.
• Formulation of Finite Mixture Models
Let D1;D2; ...;Dnbe an identically distributed p-dimensional observation from a distribution
with probability density function :
f (d;pi) =
K∑
k=1
pikfk (d) , (4)
where pik is the k
th mixing proportion which represents the probability that the observation
Di belongs to the k
th subpopulation with corresponding densityfk (d), called the k
th mixing or
component density. Here, K represents the total number of components with pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., piK)
′
lying in the (K − 1)-dimensional simplex, i.e. 0 ≤ pik ≤ 1,∀ k = 1, 2, ...,K and
∑K
k=1 pik = 1.
Usually fk’s are assumed to be of parametric form i.e.fk (d) ≡ fk (d|x, υk), where the func-
tional form of fk (.; .) is completely known, except for the parameterizing vector υk. One of the
innovations in this paper is that we also parameterize the probability for observation i to belong
to component k, given its characteristics Zi, as follows:
pik (d|Zi;ψk) = exp (Ziψk)
exp (Ziψ1) + exp (Ziψ2) + ...+ exp (Ziψk−1) + 1
(5)
Consequently, the finite mixture model density can be formulated as follows:
f (d|x, Z; υ, ψ) =
K∑
k=1
pi (d|Z;ψk−1) fk (d|x; υk) (6)
Thus, mixture models can be viewed as a semi parametric compromise between a fully para-
metric model, represented by a single parametric family (k=1) and a fully nonparametric model,
as represented in the case k=K by the kernel method of density estimation.4 Therefore, Fi-
6“How [we are] to discriminate between a true curve of skew type and a compound [that is, a mixture] curve,
supposing we have no reason to suspect our statistics a priori of mixture. I have at present been able to find any
general condition among moments, which would be impossible for a skew curve and possible for a compound, and
so indicate compoundness. I do not, however, despair of one being found” Pearson (1895, P. 394)
4For Jordan and Xu (1995), mixture model-based approaches are parametric in the sense that parametric
components are specified in the density functions, but they can also be regarded as nonparametric by allowing
the number of components k to grow
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nite Mixture Models have a large variety of nonparametric approaches, while retaining some of
the advantages of parametric approaches, such as keeping the dimension of the parameter space
down to a reasonable size.
In this paper, we rely on the visualization of the kernel density and on the conclusion of the
QQ plot test to set the number of components to K=2. The price for this flexibility is an increase
in the number of parameters with the number of components fk. Indeed, rather than estimating
one set of parameters, three subsets of parameters are estimated. These are: υ1, υ2 and ψ1,
which are the parameters associated with the contribution of each covariant X respectively to
the density of component 1, component 2 and the relative contribution of each covariant Z to
the probability of belonging to component 1. The second implication associated with our choice
of k=2 is that specification (5), representing the probability of belonging to component one, is a
simple logit model.
• Likelihood Maximization via the EM Algorithm
The estimation of finite mixture models is carried out using an Expectation-Maximization algo-
rithm (EM). The EM algorithm is an iterative (a succession of expectations and maximization
steps), strictly hill-climbing procedure whose performance can depend severely on particular
starting points since the likelihood function often depicts numerous local maxima. Many dif-
ferent initialization procedures have been suggested in the literature but no method uniformly
outperforms all others. In this paper, the starting values of group weights are set to equal
observed empirical frequencies.
• Marginal effects and interpretation of parameters
The interpretation of finite mixture model parameters is not straightforward. To simplify under-
standing, let us consider the conditional mean of duration obtained from FMM:
E (di|Xi, Zi) =
2∑
k=1
pikλk with λk = Ek (di|Xi, Zi) (7)
The parameters υk represent the marginal effect of Xi on the within variability of duration
in each component k, and are given by: υk =
∂Ek (di|Xi, Zi)
∂Xi
. The parameters ψk represent the
15
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marginal effect of each concomitant variable Zi on the probability of belonging to the component
k. Hence, the model allows capturing both the variability within and between the groups.
As can be seen graphically in Appendix:Figure 8, the interpretation of the model is as follows:
A positive coefficient υ1 in component one means that the duration between crises within the
first group increases. Equally, a positive coefficient υ2 in component 2 shows an increase in the
period of stability within the second group of observations. A positive coefficient ψ1 reflects a
heightened probability of belonging to group one.
It is possible that the three coefficients of the same variable appear with opposite signs and
different levels of significance for the two components and the probability, since estimations may
follow different dynamics between and across subgroups.
3.2 Choice and computation of covariants
Our framework of analysis for the duration of stability periods involves a specific treatment for
covariants X and Z. The transformations adopted are motivated by the fact that our dependent
variable is constant for every year regressed upon. An additional motivation is that many eco-
nomic time series occasionally exhibit dramatic breaks in their behavior associated with events
such as financial crises (Jeanne and Masson (2002), Cerra (2005) and Hamilton (2005) ). For
this purpose, we need to distinguish the period of relative stability from the period during which
the potential break occurs before a financial crisis. Our strategy consists of defining two kinds
of transformations for covariants. We split the stability period between two crises into two sub-
periods: a period until three years before occurrence of a financial crisis and a period covering
the three years preceding a crisis ending a period of stability.
Subsequently, we compute a deviation from a linear trend for the first period, and a geometric
growth rate of each covariant for the second period:
X¯TRENDdev =
1
N
T ′=t′+d−3=T−3∑
t=t′
[
X −
(
αˆ+ βˆt
)]
and XGROWTH3 =
( XT
XT−3
)1
3
− 1 (8)
Where t’ is the date of current crisis and T is the date of the next crisis.
Each variable enters the model twice for each component and for the determination of the
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probability. Each time, the coefficients can be interpreted as the long term and short term factors
influencing the duration of a period of stability. We do not consider the deviation from trend
variable for component one, as it would be a trend calculated over two years in the case of 5 year
stability periods.
Figure 5: Illustration
4 Estimation
4.1 Small sample issue: Bootstrap simulations
While the number of observations is “sufficient” to perform the FMM model for currency crises,
the low frequency of debt crises makes estimations of the latter less reliable. A solution to treat
this small sample issue is to use the nonparametric bootstrap method, a simulation technique
consisting of re-estimating iteratively the FMM parameters for randomly drawn samples 7. B sub
samples of K length are extracted with replacement from the original sample, and estimations
yield a vector θˆ of parameters; with θˆ =
(
ψˆ, υˆ
)
We set B=1000.
From these bootstrap estimates an indicator “p” is built as the ratio of the number of estimates
within a confidence interval at 0.95 (i.e. statistically significant at 5 %) to the number of total
re-samplings. A high score of “p” suggests that for a large share of the re-samplings the results
are robust.
In the next subsection, we use bootstrap simulations as robust results for debt crises pa-
rameters and as robustness tests for the currency crises parameters obtained from the initial
sample.
7The advantage of this technique is its simplicity, its applicability to a wide range of nonlinear models, and its
reliance on weak distributional assumptions.
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4.2 Results
Estimations are carried out using three groups of explanatory variables: Real variables, financial
and monetary variables, as well as equilibrium or long-term variables.
4.2.1 Currency crises
• Real Variables
Within the group of real variables (Investment, the real interest rate, and GDP per capita),
the coefficients of investment growth and GDP growth 3 years before a crises are positive and
significant in component one. This means that high GDP and investment growth in the three
years prior to a crisis tend to postpone potential financial crises conditional on the observation
belonging to the group of relatively short stability periods of around five years. As investment
after financial crises is observed to recover within a period of three to seven years, we believe that
the positive coefficient captures the recovery process rather than a boom-bust development. It is
assumed that economic recovery after financial crises depends crucially on investment recovery. If
thus investment picks up sufficiently strong, less of an incentive exists to recover growth through
a devaluation/depreciation of the exchange rate.
In the same line, a prolonging effect on the duration of stability can be observed in component
two(Stability periods around 15 years).
In the wake of capital flights and/or speculative attacks, a country can follow three possible
courses of action. It can either decide to sell foreign currency reserves in order to support its
currency, it can increase its remuneration to capital by raising interest rates and hoping to
attract foreign capital, or in the last case accept the depreciation. In our sample, an increase in
the real interest rate decreases the duration of stability periods on both components. A hike of
the interest rate before a currency crises seems to have been a frequently adopted, however often
unsuccessful measure.
While the results obtained regarding GDP growth are in line with the conclusions drawn
by e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who find that currency crises are generally preceded by
negative GDP growth8, the fact that real interest rate hikes are correlated with shorter durations
8As Kaminsky and Reinhart consider a time window of 18 month before and after financial crises, their results
can be compared with the results presented above regarding average growth of variables three years prior to a
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of stability does not coincide with their results. The predominance of currency crises during the
1970’s in their sample could explain this difference9.
Table 1: Finite mixture model for Currency crises : Real Variables
Real Variables:Baseline Real Variables:Augmented
VARIABLES component1 component2 imlogitpi1 component1 component2 imlogitpi1
nirGrowth3 1.957*** -0.408 1.577 -0.831*** -5.348* 132.4
(0.725) (3.219) (1.392) (0.0858) (3.112) (45,287)
mnirTRENDdev 0 0 0* 0
(0) (0) (0) (4.8e-09)
gdppercapGrowth3 5.889*** 4.715 1.147 4.535*** 22.81*** 106.5
(1.788) (4.859) (2.225) (0.140) (6.868) (63,238)
gdppercapTRENDdev 0.0001 2.7e-05 0.0002*** -0.0056
(7.6e-05) (2.8e-05) (6.1e-05) (1.726)
RealinterestGrowth3 -2.546*** -7.814*** -71.23
(0.0627) (1.646) (49,060)
RealinterestTRENDdev -0.0424 -9.088
(0.0490) (1,057)
Constant 5.428*** 13.99*** -0.0336 8.572*** 17.36*** -18.60
(0.153) (0.638) (0.238) (0.0501) (2.898) (42,665)
lnsigma -0.125 1.250*** -4.015*** 0.946***
(0.140) (0.131) (0.250) (0.141)
Observations 102 102 102 33 33 33
• Financial and monetary variables
The ratio of M2 over reserves can be interpreted as a measure of the vulnerability towards a
speculative attack. M2 is the quantity of money that can be exchanged, while foreign exchange
reserves are the means which a Central bank can use to defend the currency in the case of a
speculative attack. An increase in the ratio has a decreasing effect on the duration between crises
in component two. One reason being that reserves often have been decreased substantially in
order to fight off speculative attacks, which at some point has diminished reserves sufficiently to
render the attack successful. On the other hand, the ratio represents the extend to which the
economy is supported by monetary easing. Often enough, this policy is adopted during years
preceding a crisis.
crisis.
9In the 1970’s, interest rates were highly regulated and therefore not particularly informative as leading financial
crises indicators.
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The result concerning the behavior of the ratio of M2 over reserves before financial crises is
confirmed by Sachs et al. (1996), as well as by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). In addition,
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that prior to currency crises, the ratio of M2 over reserves
increases due to both, monetary easing and a decrease in international reserves.
The ratio of Credit over GDP is only significant for the deviation from trend in component
two, representing long durations of stability, and shows a positive sign. The growth rate of credit
over gdp for the three years before a crisis depicts a negative sign, is however not significant.
Since the Fisher test rejects the null for joint insignificance, we can interpret both results.
As observed by Sachs et al. (1996) and by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), the growth rate
of the ratio three years before a crisis depicts a certain boom and bust development. Moreover,
the deviation from trend can be interpreted as a reflection of the progress of recovery.
Net foreign assets are the difference between foreign assets held by residents and domestic
assets held by foreigners. An increase in net foreign assets decreases the possibility of a sudden
stop as the country is or becomes a net creditor. The coefficient in component two is consequently
positive and significant for both, the deviation from trend and the growth of net foreign assets
three years before a crisis. Unexpectedly, the probability coefficient shows a positive sign. Shorter
durations of stability are therefore related to larger growth of net foreign assets during the three
years before the onset of a crises.
• Equilibrium (External) variables
The negative sign in component two for short term increases in the current account is negative
and significant. We suspect that the relative position of countries compared to the balance of the
current account matters. In order to evaluate this suspicion, we re-estimate the model including
the fact that a country depicts a positive or negative current account. We introduce a dummy
variable in the specification for countries which have a negative current account balance and
an interactive term, which captures the heterogeneity in the impact of the current account. By
doing so, the current account loses its significance. Due to this observation, we will focus on the
development of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade in order to capture drivers of the
current account instead of the current account itself.
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The real exchange rate captures two effects. The first one reflects the evolution of the nominal
exchange rate, the second captures the development of the internal price level compared to the
external price level of the 10 countries constituting the reference group. An increase in the real
exchange rate implies a real depreciation. Our results show that a depreciation in the three years
before a crisis increases the probability to belong to group one. As the variable is constructed
over a three year period, the nominal exchange rate effect is likely to dominate the price effect.
Therefore we probably capture an effect in line with the second generation of self fulfilling crises
models. Constant depreciation, possibly coupled with self-reinforcing speculative attacks, are
observed prior to the actual currency crisis. The often mentioned long term real appreciation
before currency crises cannot be confirmed by our model as the coefficients for the deviation
from trend are not significant.
Terms of trade are calculated as the ratio between prices of export goods and import goods of
a given country. In our model, increasing terms of trade have a stabilizing effect for both groups
of durations in the short- and in the long-run. Positive deviations from trend for a prolonged
period of time increase the probability to belong to the second group of observations. Thus, an
increase in terms of trade increases the duration between currency crises, consistent with the
finding of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). The interpretation of these results is straightforward.
Intuitively, it is beneficial for a country if the goods it exports achieve higher prices on world
markets and the goods that are imported are as cheap as possible. As small countries have little
possibility to influence international prices, a positive growth of this ratio leads to less of a need
to depreciate the exchange rate in order to regain competitiveness.
The bootstrap simulations confirm these results for all coefficients except for the coefficient
of real interest rate growth in the probability (Annex: Table 13, 14 and 15 ).
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4.2.2 Debt crises
The limited number of observations with respect to the parameters chosen leads us to consider
separate specifications for each concomitant variable. Furthermore, we dropped variables for
which the iterative EM did not converge.
• Real Variables
For debt crises, it is interesting to compare the impact of our concomitant variables with the
macroeconomic indicators used by rating agencies to assess a country’s probability of default.
Some of the most decisive factors determining a credit rating are usually the GDP per capita,
GDP growth, the current account, and the interest rate.
Higher GDP growth has a prolonging effect on the duration of stability periods. Indeed, the
coefficients of component 1 and component 2 are positive, while the coefficient of the probability
is negative. This suggests that higher GDP growth increases the spell of time between two debt
crises and increases the probability to belong to the group of observations experiencing long
periods of stability between debt crises. These results are consistent with the debt sustainability
literature.
As stated by Canuto et al (2004), governments of high per capita income countries typically
possess a low risk assessment. Per capita income is normally regarded as a good indicator of the
general level of economic and institutional development of a particular country. Rich countries’
governments have a larger flexibility to adopt tight policies in adverse periods.
The rating agency Moody’s (2003) asserts the relevance of a given range of variables according
to the level of a country’s development. Most rating agencies (see Fitch, 1998, Moody’s, 2003)
reason that authorities in developed countries with a long history of economic and institutional
stability possess better instruments for managing public debts, high fiscal deficits and unexpected
economic shocks. The results obtained confirm the general logic followed by these rating agencies.
The richer a country, the higher the probability that the duration between debt crises is large
(the observation belongs to component two)10.
10High income is thus important to forego crises given that a default occurs relatively frequent. Once a country
has proven to default sufficiently seldom, the income level effect vanishes.
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Table 2: Simulation : GDP per Capita growth
Signif. initial FMM Coef. p
component1 *** 26.31*** .87887888
(6.561)
component2 6.930 .88188188
(16.38)
imlogitpi1 -2.974 .92692693
(10.75)
Table 3: Simulation : GDP per Capita level
Signif. initial FMM Coef. p
component1 -6.08e-05 .925
(0.000359)
component2 ** -0.000323 .873
(0.000249)
imlogitpi1 * -0.000167 .776
(0.000355)
• Financial and monetary variables
High growth of the ratio of credit over GDP prolongs stability periods for both groups of
observations. For component one, the basis of calculation for the coefficient covers nearly the
whole period of recovery. Its positive sign reflects the ability of credit to recover after debt
crises and it is equally an indicator of confidence. Within component two, high credit over GDP
growth leads to increased length of stability periods. According to Canuto et al. (2004), the
domestic credit available as a percentage of GDP is a good indicator for the level of financial
development. In general, the issuers of countries with high credit to gdp ratios receive better
ratings. The statistical quality of these results is assessed through the “p” indicator, suggesting
high statistical significance the closer the indicator is to one. The “p” indicator for the growth
rate of credit over GDP in the probability is quite low ( it indicates that only 63% of re-sampling
coefficients are inside an interval confidence at 5%), rendering interpretation little reliable.
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Table 4: Simulation : Credit over GDP growth
Signif. initial FMM Coef. p
component1 *** 8.379 .81039755
(5.301)
component2 8.286 .86340469
(12.77)
imlogitpi1 1.456 .63098879
(6.277)
• Equilibrium (External) variables
In general, one would expect a positive growth of the current account over GDP and an
increase in the level of the current account (measured by the growth of net foreign assets) to
enhance the length of stability periods for both components11. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
show however that the behavior of the current account balance during the 18 months preceding
twin crises does not matter. Our results are consistent with their findings12.
A positive external shock on a country’s terms of trade can render a deficit more sustainable
and ameliorate anticipations of foreign investors about the ability of a country to repay its debt.
This leads to a consequent increase of capital flows towards the country. The results presented
in table 9 suggest indeed that an improvement in the terms of trade increases stability periods
for both groups of observations13.
Table 5: Simulation : Current Account balance over GDP
Signif. initial FMM Coef. p
component1 -0.691 .62134945
(2.868)
component2 * -5.937 .89224572
(3.783)
imlogitpi1 0.0933 .89325277
(23.23)
11Hence, an improvement of the external debt position of a country reduces the risk to experience a default.
12An alternative explanation could be that the GDP dynamics dominate the dynamics of the current account.
In addition, Kaminsky et al. state that it is the composition of capital inflows rather than the current account
balance itself which matters.
13The low “p” value from the bootstrap simulations carried out makes results less reliable. In the same line, we
observe a counterintuitive increase in the probability of an observation to belong to the first group of observations
in the case of a positive shock to terms of trade.
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Table 6: Simulation : Terms of trade
Signif. initial FMM Coef. p
component1 *** 12.30 .65993946
(6.694)
component2 * 34.82 .71745711
(30.19)
imlogitpi1 ** 23.75 .88597376
(20.11)
4.2.3 Predictive quality Analysis
The task of assessing model fit is not straightforward for mixture models, at least not for mul-
tivariate data. Two strategies are proposed in the literature. For univariate data, the goodness
of FMM predictions can be tested by comparing the fitted mixture density with the data in
histogram form. Alternatively, Aitkin (1997) advocates a comparison of the fitted mixture dis-
tribution function with the empirical distribution. In this sub-section, we choose to evaluate the
predictive quality of each group of independent variables by using the second option.
As shown in Figure 6, the FMM model predicts durations between currency crises fairly
well. Clear differences between the three groups of variables exist. Globally, real variables
have the highest predictive power for the countries experiencing currency crises frequently. The
second group of countries is better represented through usage of financial variables. Equilibrium
variables lead to an over fitting of the distribution for both groups14.
Table 7: Predictive quality: AIC Information Criterion
SPECIFICATION REAL FIN. and MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM
OTHERS REAL INTEREST RATE
CURRENCY CRISIS 139.4587 – 468.1525 396.8343
DEBT CRISIS 100.4615 73.83928 95.65441 85.47905
Turning towards debt crises, it is somewhat astounding that the real interest rate is the best
14For group one, it makes intuitive sense that the variables chosen lead to over fitting, since nearly all variables
within this group do not exhibit large variability over the short term. For the second group, over fitting is smaller
than for group one if second order stochastic dominance is taken into account.
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predictor. According to the AIC information criteria, the real interest rate predicts the duration
between debt crises slightly better than equilibrium variables, which in turn predict better than
financial variables. Real variables without the real interest rate depict serious under fitting.
Figure 6: Predictive quality of FMM specification : Currency crises
Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 7: Predictive quality of FMM specification : Debt crises
Source: Authors’ calculations
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5 Policy recommendations after systemic financial crises
In this section we analyze the duration of stability periods after systemic crises, defined as a
banking crisis preceded or followed either by a currency or a debt crisis, or in the most extreme
case the occurrence of all three types of crises within a period of 5 years.
Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that twin crises and
systemic crises are most harmful in terms of output loss and time of recovery. Hence, a challenging
task for policymakers is to implement measures that alleviate financial strains and restore credit
functioning, but to avoid planting the seeds for a next crisis. In order to assess the impact of
macroeconomic and microeconomic policies in the period after a systemic crisis, we use indicators
as provided by the IMF systemic banking crisis resolution database (Leaven and Valencia (2008)).
The explanatory variables are divided in three groups: macroeconomic policies, containment
measures and resolution measures.
Macroeconomic policies are the average change in reserve money and average fiscal balances
during the first three years after a systemic crisis and a dummy variable if an IMF program was
put in place.
Containment measures are the immediate policy responses to liquidity stress in the early
stage of a financial crisis. We consider a dummy variable depicting if reserve requirements were
lowered to sustain the money multiplier and the maximum of liquidity support in percentage of
deposits that monetary authorities accorded to banks.
Resolution measures are the medium term policies adopted to restructure borrowers and
lenders’ balance sheets and to restore bank functionality. This is a critical task. On the one
hand, a country restoring a sounder credit system is supposed to recover faster. On the other
hand, these operations imply high fiscal costs and may foster moral hazard. We also consider if the
government interferes with bank management using systemic interventions (like recapitalization
nationalizations, closures, mergers, and sales), and more specifically the gross recapitalization
costs to governments as a percentage of GDP. We also include a dummy variable if a deposit
insurance scheme was in place at the start of a banking crisis and 2 dummy variables for regulatory
forbearance in the case that banks were permitted to function, although technically insolvent,
and whether prudential regulations were suspended or not fully applied.
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As the distribution of the duration of stability after systemic banking crises turns out to be
not bimodal, we used OLS techniques to assess the impact of the three distinct groups of policy
variables. Tables 8 and 9 display the results.
Table 11. indicates that the countries which adopt an IMF program during and/or after
systemic banking crisis experience longer stability periods.
Turning towards fiscal and monetary policy, results point towards the fact that expansionary
monetary policy put into place during the first three years after a crisis reduces the duration
of stability. This result should be treated with caution. A possibility exists that the result is
influenced through imperfect measurement of the monetary policy index. Firstly, the measure
does not capture some aspects of monetary policy such as the management of interest rates.
Secondly, our index of systemic banking crisis corresponds to a banking crisis which is followed
by a currency crisis and /or a debt crisis. Therefore, when a currency crisis occurs one year after
a banking crisis, the variation of reserves may simply reflect the reaction of the central bank
attempting to sustain its currency and trying to avoid a currency crisis.
Regarding fiscal policy, we find that an expansionary fiscal policy during the first three
years after a systemic banking crisis has no effect on the duration of the length of the stability
period. Following this finding, it would be interesting to divide the sample of systemic crises into
banking crises followed by currency crises and banking crises followed by debt crises. In fact, the
effect of “crisis contingent-fiscal policy” measures may depend on other factors such as initial
macroeconomic conditions (e.g. the initial level of fiscal deficit)15.
The first two columns of Table 9 show the results for the assessment of the impact of immediate
measures adopted by the governments to contain the impact of a crisis. Column two indicates that
the duration of stability periods after a systemic crisis decreases with the level of the maximum
of liquidity support in percentage of deposit that monetary authorities accorded to banks. It is
however not influenced by the reduction of reserve requirements in the three years following a
crisis.
Once emergency measures have been put into place to contain a crisis, the government faces
15The role of fiscal policy on the process of recovery after financial crises is an open debate in macroeconomics.
On one hand, Keynesian theory suggests that government spending could push private demand and the economic
production. On the other hand, the New Classicals’ viewpoint expresses that public expenditure could restore
confidence of investors, therefore lowering the risk premium, emitting a positive effect on economic activity even
in the short term.
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the long-run challenge of crisis resolution, which entails the resumption of a normally functioning
credit and legal system, and the rebuilding of banks’ and borrowers’ balance sheets. Columns 3
and 4 of Table 9 show the impact of an adoption of these measures on the stability period after
a given crisis.
On the one hand, it seems that only large-scale government interventions in banks, such as
nationalizations, closures, mergers, sales, and re-capitalizations of large banks have a positive
impact on the duration of stability periods.
On the other hand, the results indicate that a recapitalization16 has a reducing effect on the
length of stability periods after a systemic banking crisis. This result can be explained following
two arguments. The first one focuses on the inherent information asymmetry according to which
recapitalization could result in an increase of moral hazard. Indeed, when a recapitalization is
put in place, it is very unlikely that the creditors incur losses, unless the recapitalization fails
and the firm is subsequently put into insolvency. In this case, creditors are bailed out, creating
significant moral hazard. In addition, if shareholders are only diluted or receive compensation,
this will further exacerbate moral hazard by socializing the losses.17 Beyond this, Claessens et al.
(2011) noted that public re-capitalizations, by aiming to have a rapid effect, avoid stigmatization
and support lending. On the down side, they may be detrimental in the long run if spread too
broadly, thereby foregoing the benefits of separating viable from nonviable institutions.
Another explanation for the lack of impact is related to the nature of the crisis. In fact, when
a systemic crisis is a national one, idiosyncratic resolution measures could be efficient. However,
if a systemic crisis is global, coordinated actions of concerned countries are more appropriate.
According to the estimations carried out above, one policy recommendation clearly hints
towards large-scale government interventions which may help to restore the confidence in banks
and to sustain accelerated recovery of the economy. In addition, an adoption of IMF programs
during and/or after a systemic banking crisis may help to stabilize the economy (i.e. increase
the duration of the stability period after the crisis), but this last solution involves a partial loss
of sovereignty of governments.
16In the form of (1) cash , (2) government bonds, (3) subordinated debt, (4) preferred shares, (5) purchase of
bad loans, (6) credit lines, (7) assumption of bank liabilities, or (8) ordinary shares.
17The moral hazard argument could also be invoked to explain why other resolution measures (Deposit insur-
ance, Prudential regulation suspended, Bank permitted functioning)have no statistically significant impact on the
stability period after a systemic banking crisis.
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Table 8: Macro Policy Index
VARIABLES (1)
Macro Policy Index -0.465***
(0.140)
Fiscal policy Index -27.93
(37.47)
IMF Program 5.970**
(2.376)
constant 11.78***
(2.078)
Observations 35
R-squared 0.231
Table 9: Containement and Resolutions Measures
Containement Measures Resolution Measures
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank permitted functioning -3.901 -4.042
(2.509) (2.457)
Prudential regulation suspended 1.597 1.605
(2.736) (2.568)
Gov. Intervention 9.234*** 10.10***
(2.520 (2.502)
Recapitalization -7.28*** -5.26*
(2.050) (2.947)
Deposit Insurance 1.532 0.870
(2.482)
Low res requirement -2.86 -2.453
(2.367) (2.315)
Peak support -1.939 -3.569**
(1.384) (1.466)
IMF program 4.600** 3.879
(2.217) (2.903)
R-squared 0.054 0.150 0.246 0.307
Observations 40 40 37 37
30
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.64
6 Conclusion
This paper has used an innovative econometric strategy, the Finite Mixture Model, to assess
the determinants of the duration between financial crises, the aim having been to identify which
factors explain why some countries are more prone to enjoy long durations of stability, while
others experience crises in shorter intervals.
To this end, we analyzed the duration of stability periods between currency, debt, and banking
crises from 1980 to 2008. The distribution of this variable was found to be bimodal regarding
currency and debt crisis and two groups of observations emerged: one depicting average stability
periods of around 5 years and a second group experiencing crises roughly each 15 years, while
the distribution of the duration between banking crises is unimodal.
After having shown that the distribution of the dependent variable does not allow for tra-
ditional estimation methods, the finite mixture model approach has been utilized. The FMM
was estimated separately for currency and debt crises including 3 groups of concomitant vari-
ables: real variables, financial and monetary variables, as well as equilibrium or external sector
variables.
The main findings about spells of stability between currency crises were that high GDP and
investment growth in the three years prior to a currency crises tend to postpone potential crises
conditional on the observation belonging to the group of relatively short stability periods of five
years.
An increase in the real interest rate during the three years prior to a crisis decreases the
duration of stability periods within both components. An interest rate increase before a currency
crises seems to have been a frequently adopted, however often unsuccessful measure.
An increase in the ratio of M2 over reserves has a decreasing effect on the duration between
currency crises given that an observation belongs to the group of observations experiencing long
stability periods, while an accumulation of net foreign assets does prove to be an effective mean to
prolong stability periods for all groups of observations and during all points in time. Sustained
credit growth during the stability period postpones potential currency crises, while a certain
boom and bust behavior in cases of high credit growth can be confirmed. Regarding the real
exchange rate, we capture an effect in line with the second generation of self fulfilling crises
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models. Constant depreciation, possibly coupled with self-reinforcing speculative attacks, are
observed prior to the actual currency crisis. The often mentioned long term real appreciation
before currency crises cannot be confirmed by our model.
Due to a limited sample size we confirmed our results with the help of bootstrap estimations
for currency crises and considered separate specifications for each concomitant variable for debt
crises. We found that our results are consistent with the debt sustainability literature and
that the main country characteristics usually considered by rating agencies in order to classify
sovereign default risk are statistically significant in explaining the length of stability periods
between debt crises.
We assessed model fit by comparing the fitted mixture distribution function with the empirical
distribution and found that the FMM model predicts durations between financial crises fairly
well.
We studied the impact of macroeconomic policies, containment measures, and resolution
measures on the duration of stability periods after systemic crises. We found that an expansionary
fiscal policy during the first three years after a systemic banking crisis has no effect on the
duration of the length of the stability period.
The duration of stability periods after a systemic crisis decreases with the level of the maxi-
mum of liquidity support in percentage of deposit that monetary authorities accorded to banks.
It is however not influenced by the reduction of reserve requirements in the three years following
a crisis.
Explained through information asymmetry and an increase in moral hazard, we concluded
that only large-scale government interventions in banks, such as nationalizations, closures, merg-
ers, sales, and re-capitalizations of large banks have a positive impact on the duration of stability
periods, while recapitalization has a reducing effect on the length of stability periods after a sys-
temic banking crisis.
Large-scale government interventions may help to restore the confidence in banks and to
sustain accelerated recovery of the economy, while an adoption of IMF programs during and/or
after a systemic banking crisis may be beneficial for a stabilization of the economy.
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7 Appendix
Figure 8: Representation of FMM parameters
18Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 10: Growth rate heterogenity according to duration subgroups
GROUP Real Variables Financial and Monetary Variables Equilibrium / External Variables
Investment M2/Reserves Current Account / GDP
GDP per capita Credit/GDP Real Exchange Rate
Real interest rate Net foreign assets / GDP Terms of Trade
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Table 11: Finite mixture model for Currency crises : Financial and Monetary variables
VARIABLES component1 component2 imlogitpi1
m2reserveGrowth3 0.101 -5.003** 1.122
(0.552) (2.103) (1.014)
m2reserveTRENDdev -0.0008 0.0119
(0.0327) (0.0122)
creditgdpGrowth3 -0.729 -5.315 1.900
(1.902) (3.854) (2.351)
creditgdpTRENDdev 9.123*** -1.317
(2.961) (1.987)
nfaewngdpGrowth3 -0.885 14.46*** 3.570*
(1.071) (3.917) (2.080)
nfaewngdpTRENDdev 0.435*** -0.0592
(0.111) (0.0457)
Constant 5.854*** 8.726*** 0.315
(0.304) (2.009) (0.802)
lnsigma -0.172 1.109***
(0.153) (0.114)
Observations 86 86 86
Table 12: Finite mixture model for Currency crises : Equilibrium variables
VARIABLES component1 component2 imlogitpi1
cabgdpGrowth3 -0.0726 -2.857* -0.0234
(0.496) (1.503) (0.852)
cabgdpTRENDdev 5.138 1.969
(11.65) (4.659)
insreerGrowth3 0.192 6.434 8.431**
(1.743) (10.26) (4.221)
insreerTRENDdev 0.00164 -0.00114
(0.00839) (0.00554)
ttGrowth3 8.710*** 32.29** 5.613
(3.301) (12.62) (5.972)
ttTRENDdev 0.0290** -0.0264**
(0.0130) (0.0108)
Constant 5.580*** 15.24*** 0.817**
(0.173) (0.973) (0.403)
lnsigma -0.0908 1.064***
(0.122) (0.137)
Observations 73 73 73
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Table 13: Simulation : Real Variables
VARIABLES Coef. p
nirGrowth3 comp 1 1.957 0.793
gdppercapGrowth3 comp 1 5.889** 0.82
RealinterestGrowth3 prob 2.472 0.85788382
RealinterestTRENDdev prob -0.0744 0.83609959
Table 14: Simulation :Equilibrium Variables
VARIABLES Coef. p
ttGrowth3 comp 1 8.710 0.863
ttGrowth3 prob 0.0290 0.916
ttTRENDdev comp 2 32.29* 0.804
cabgdpGrowth3 comp 2 -2.857 0.9
insreerGrowth3 prob 8.431 0.86
Table 15: Simulation :Financial and Monetary Variables
VARIABLES Coef. p
m2reserveGrowth3 comp 1 -5.003* 0.82299084
creditgdpTRENDdev comp 2 9.123** 0.82706002
nfaewngdpGrowth3 comp 2 14.46** 0.78738555
nfaewngdpTRENDdev comp 2 0.435*** 0.74465921
nfaewngdpGrowth3 prob 3.570 0.87487284
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Table 16: Macroeconomic Indicators
Variable Name Description Source
gdpr GDP (constant LCU) from WDI extended using
WEO real GDP growth
World Bank, World Development Indicators
(WDI), 2009 IMF, World Economic Outlook
Database (WEO), April 2009
nir Gross capital formation, constant prices IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (WEO),
April 2009
gdppercap GDP (constant LCU) from WDI extended using
WEO real GDP growth divided by the population
as reported in the WDI, 2009
World Bank, World Development Indicators
(WDI), 2009 IMF, World Economic Outlook
Database (WEO), April 2009
Realinterest Real Interest Rate (%) World Bank, World Development Indicators
(WDI), 2009
m2reserve Money and quasi money (M2) to total reserves
ratio
IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (WEO),
April 2009
creditgdp Bank credit to private sector, in percent of GDP IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (WEO),
April 2009
nfaewngdp Net Foreign Assets (NFA) divided by GDP (con-
stant LCU) from WDI extended using WEO real
GDP growth
External Wealth of Nations, IMF, 2007 World
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI),
2009 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database
(WEO), April 2009
cabgdp Current account balance to GDP, (%) IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (WEO),
April 2009
reer Real effective exchange rate index (2000 = 100) IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (WEO),
April 2009
tt Terms of trade, goods and services IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (WEO),
April 2009
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